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Wyszukujesz frazę "epistemology" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7
Tytuł:
Philosophical Doubts about reality
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2232465.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023-07-17
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
metaphilosophy
epistemology
metaphysics
science
realism
Opis:
There are many pragmatisms, and it is a litle misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce's and James' philosophy, while C.I. Lewis' views on logic were quite diefrent from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in contemporary neo-pragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display diefrent opinions on most subjects. I shall draw some comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers. As a maetr of fact there are many pragmatisms, so that it is a litle misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce's and James' philosophy, while C.I. Lewis' views on logic were quite diefrent from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in today neopragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display diefrent opinions on most subjects. In the present section we shall draw some sketchy comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers. Rescher views the contrast between himself and Rorty as a continuation of the struggle between an objective pragmatism (or “pragmatism of the right”) which includes the triad Peirce-Lewis-Rescher, and a subjective one (or “pragmatism of the left”) 1 which comprises James, the early and middle Dewey, and Rorty. The later Dewey assumes, in this picture, a middle-of-the-road position. While Rorty must certainly be praised for both overcoming the linguistic turn and making pragmatism popular again in American philosophy following several decades of relative forgetfulness, Rescher argues that the Rortyan interpretation of pragmatism is too partial. In particular, by taking Rorty too seriously one is led to believe that pragmatism implies relativism. 1 Marsonet, Michele. “Diefrent pragmatist reactions to analytic philosophy.” New Perspectives on Pragmatism and Analytic Philosophy, edited by Rosa M. Calcaterra, Studies in Pragmatism and Values, 2011, 101-107
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2023, 14, 28; 219-223
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Epistemological Side of Ontology
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2158879.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023-01-05
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
epistemology
ontology
metaphysics
science
common sense
Opis:
Is it possible to draw a border line between ontology and epistemology? A positive answer to this question looks attractive, mainly because it reflects convictions deeply entrenched in our common sense view of the world. However, anyone wishing to clarify the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions meets problems. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is not clean, but rather fuzzy. It is certainly correct to state that science means to offer correct information about the world, but the extent to which it succeeds in accomplishing this task is always questionable. We cannot claim that the picture provided by today science - our current scientific image of the world - is absolutely correct, because the history of science itself shows us that any such statement is likely to be rejected by future generations. While it may be recognized that science purports to offer a correct description of the real world, the past experience should also prompt us to accept its claims sub condicione, and to view them as merely provisional.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2023, 14, 27; 11-19
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Critique of the Philosophical Underpinnings
Autorzy:
Oppong, Seth
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036370.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
epistemology
ontology
axiology
social science research
indigenization
Opis:
The progress of the social science disciplines depends on conducting relevant research. However, research methodology adopted and choices made during the course of the research project are underpinned by varying ontological, epistemological and axiological positions that may be known or unknown to the researcher. This paper sought to critically explore the philosophical underpinnings of the social science research. It was suggested that a “multiversal” ontological position, positivist-hermeneutic epistemological position and value-laden axiological position should be adopted for social science research by non-western scholars as alternative to the dominant naïve realist, positivist, and value-free orientation. Against the backdrop of producing context-relevant knowledge, non-western scholars are encouraged to re-examine their philosophical positions in the conduct of social science research.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2014, 10; 242-254
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pragmatism and Evolutionary Epistemology
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036785.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
evolution
epistemology
fallibilism
history
mankind
nature
anthropocentrism
Opis:
To understand the significance of a pragmatist stance in this matter we must address a basic question: which kind of evolution are we referring to when talking of “evolutionary epistemology”? If we take evolution to be an undifferentiated concept, such that no useful distinction can be found in it, we are on a wrong track. The evolutionary “pattern” is certainly one, but this should not lead us to assume that the specific characteristics of mankind must be left out of the picture, either because they are not important or because no specifically human characteristic is admitted. Nicholas Rescher’s evolutionary framework, for example, is instead pluralistic and multi-sided. It is worth noting how and why Rescher’s evolutionary epistemology differs from the one delineated in a famous book by Karl Popper. The Austrian-born philosopher based his approach on the “random conjectures and refutation” model. A scientist, for example, faces the problem of explaining nature’s doings by one of the endlessly many hypotheses that he has at his disposal. Subsequently he chooses to endorse a conjecture from this infinite range, and the testing itself, via falsification, furnishes the necessary selection. According to Popper’s picture we have, in sum, a sort of blind and random mechanism: his “trial-and-error” search procedure. Rescher’s opinion about this issue is that, on such Popperian grounds, scientific progress becomes more or less inexplicable. In particular, the success in providing explanatory theories that perform well in prediction and the guidance of applications in a complex world is now an accident of virtually miracolous proportions.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2017, 16; 105-112
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Quine on the Dogmas of Empiricism
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1037994.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
conceptual schemes
empiricism
science
epistemology
ontology
language
Opis:
In his works the American philosopher Willard van Quine constantly rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction claiming that it is not justified. This happens because, in his opinion, human statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not individually but as a corporate body, which implies that the judgment on their validity ultimately rests on experience itself. Many problems arise at this point, since even language plays a fundamental role in the Quinean view, and it must be accommodated into the picture if the picture itself means to be coherent. Conceptual scheme and external world are both necessary, but language does not seem to be a factor whose ultimate legitimacy relies on something outside the conceptual sphere, and this means in turn that we face a dualistic situation. Conceptual schemes or world-views, like the ones provided by Newtonian mechanics or quantum theory, are the primary bearers of truth, and the truth of a statement strictly depends from the particular conceptual scheme one currently adopts.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2019, 20; 93-105
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Limited View of Realism
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1035861.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
Realism
Anti-Realism
Ontology
Epistemology
Conceptual Apparatus
Nature
Opis:
In the paper we argue that no neat border line between ontology and epistemology can be drawn. This is due to the fact that the separation between factual and conceptual is rather fuzzy, and the world is characterized by a sort of ontological opacity which makes the construction of any absolute ontology difficult. Our ontology is characterized by the fact that the things of nature are seen by us in terms of a conceptual apparatus that is inevitably influenced by mind-involving elements, and all this has important consequences on both the question of scientific realism and the realism/anti-realism debate. Conceptualization gives us access to the world, while, on the other, it is the most important feature of our cultural evolution. While the idealistic thesis according to which the mind produces natural reality looks hardly tenable, it is reasonable to claim instead that we perceive this same reality by having recourse to the filter of a conceptual apparatus whose presence is, in turn, connected to the development of language and social organization. Our science is essentially relational, and not absolute. The information with which it provides us is appropriate, but from our point of view. Science provides reliable information on the world, but this information is always relative to a particular framework, and it is a mistake to think that the limits of our cognitive capacities only have an aprioristic character. Science constantly attempts at providing answers to our questions about how things stand in the world, and thus purports to offer reliable information about it. But it should also be recognized that the extent to which science succeeds in accomplishing this task is disputable. What kind of realism, thus, can we actually endorse? Despite what many relativists claim, realism still is an arguable and defendable position. If one asks what difference is made to our knowledge claims if we accept the existence of an extra-conceptual world, the answer is the following: such recognition undermines the diffused anthropocentric stance which identifies reality with our limited knowledge of it.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2012, 06; 20-34
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Language and Idealism
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1968768.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-01-01
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
language
philosophy of language
metaphysics
ontology
epistemology
logical empiricism
Opis:
In the philosophical inquiry adopted by logical empiricists, analysis of scientific language becomes something similar to a metaphysical endeavor which is meant to establish the bounds of sense, and this stance may be easily traced back to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On the other hand, the analytic tradition transferred this conception to the analysis of ordinary language, and this move, eventually, was able to restore the confidence of many philosophers in their own work. After all they were doing something important and worthwhile, that is to say, something no one else was doing, since linguists are certainly concerned with language, but from quite a different point of view. At this point we may well ask ourselves: What is wrong with this kind of approach, given the present crisis of the analytic tradition and the growing success of the so-called postanalytic thought? At first sight it looks perfectly legitimate and, moreover, it produced important results, as anybody can verify just reading the masterpieces of contemporary analytic philosophy. To answer the question: What is wrong?, we must first of all take into account language itself and check what it is meant to be within the analytic tradition. This will give our question a clear answer. We have to verify, furthermore, what kind of knowledge philosophy needs to be equipped with if it wants to preserve its autonomy. The logical positivists clearly claimed in their program that there is no synthetic a priori knowledge such as the one envisioned by Immanuel Kant. There is, however, an analytic and a priori knowledge which is supplied by mathematics and logic alone. Within this field, the techniques of contemporary formal logic are exalted because they allow us to build artificial languages which - at least theoretically - eliminate the ambiguities of everyday speech.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2021, 12, 23; 156-177
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7

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