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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Między determinizmem a prawdopodobieństwem – analiza poglądów Jana Łukasiewicza
Autorzy:
Pruski, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437333.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
objective probability
logical determinism
philosophical interpretations of probability
Opis:
In the contemporary philosophical debate about probability, one of the main problems concerns the relation between objective probability and determinism. Is it possible for objective probability and determinism to co‑exist? This is one of the questions this dispute tries to answer. The scope of discussion is conducted between advocates of a positive answer (compatibilist) and co‑existence opponents (incompatibilist). In the early twentieth century, many logicians also developed topics regarding probability and determinism. One of them was the outstanding Polish logician and philosopher — Jan Łukasiewicz. The general purpose of this paper is to analyse and implement Łukasiewicz’s views regarding determinism and probability in the contemporary field of this problem. I will try to show the relation between his interpretations of these concepts and in consequence his attempt to confront them. As a result of the above analysis, I present some different positions (located in the fields of logic and semantics) in the contemporary discourse about the relation between objective probability and determinism. Moreover, I will present Łukasiewicz’s views about this relation and the consequence of these solutions in the field of logic.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2014, 4, 2; 315-324
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Probabilistic kingdom: problem of objectivity in contemporary science
Autorzy:
Pruski, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437461.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
philosophical interpretations of probability
the objectivity of probability
probabilism
determinism
scientific realism
Opis:
In modern science, the theory of probability is one of the basic tools. Scientists using probability often refer to its objective interpretation. They emphasize that their probabilistic hypotheses concern objective facts, not degrees of belief. Accordingly, the following questions arise: What is the meaning of this type of probabilistic hypothesis? Is the assumption of objectivity necessary? The paper addresses these questions by analyzing objective probability in the context of the scientific debate on determinism. Two types of arguments will be presented. On the one hand, there is the assertion that objective probability can exist only in an indeterministic world. Then, on the other hand - I analyze the assertions of those who believe in the co‑existence of objective probability and determinism. As a result I show that the acceptance of deterministic and indeterministic fields as possible areas where objective probability can occur is extremely problematic. Depending on the chosen area we encounter different types of problems. Therefore, I show that a significant number of these problems are associated with the acceptance of incorrect metaphysical assumptions. And finally, I postulate that the objectivity of probability (and assumptions pertaining to it) can be reduced (without any losses) to the epistemic variant.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2019, 9, 2; 317-327
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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