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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Czy Budda praktykował ascezę w okresie poprzedzającym jego przebudzenie? Krytyczna analiza sutty Māhasīhanāda ze zbioru Majjhimanikāya
Autorzy:
Polak, Grzegorz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/944791.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
asceticism
meditation
the bodhisatta
Mahāvīra
early Buddhism
Jainism
Opis:
Did the Buddha practice asceticism prior to his awakening? A critical analysis of the Māhasīhanāda Sutta from the Majjhima Nikāya: It is widely believed, that the Buddha practiced the most radical forms of asceticism and self‑mortification prior to his awakening. A critical analysis of the suttas depicting that crucial period of his life shows, however, that the only text which portrays the bodhisatta as a foremost ascetic is the Māhasīhanāda Sutta (MN 12/I, 68). The aim of this paper is to examine the issue of the authenticity of this text and thus to answer the question as to whether there is enough ground to claim that the Buddha was an ascetic at all. Through a comparative analysis, I show that the structure and content of the Māhasīhanāda Sutta cannot be reconciled with other suttas from the Majjhima Nikāya, which describe the bodhisatta’s path to awakening. I point out certain late features of the Māhasīhanāda Sutta. Then, through a comparative analysis I try to show that some parts of the Buddhist text may have been borrowed from the Jain  yāraṃga Sutta. Next, I attempt to reinterpret the term attakilamathānuyogo from the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta in such a way which will not pertain to asceticism. In the final part of the paper, I try to explain how the view that the Buddha was a foremost ascetic prior to his awakening could have arisen.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2017, 7, 1; 17-32
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Does the not-Self (anattā) teaching in the Nikāyas presuppose the existence of a special type of consciousness?
Autorzy:
Polak, Grzegorz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2188272.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-10-24
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
early Buddhism
viññāṇa
the mind
citta
the aggregates
khandha-s
cognitive science
Sāṃkhya
Āgamas
Opis:
According to the historically dominant interpretation of the anattā teaching, human being is a conglomerate of the five aggregates (khandha-s). However, several early Buddhist Nikāya texts seem to suggest that within human being there exists a dichotomy of the aggregates and their counterpart. The latter may cling to the khandha-s but also become dissociated from them. In this paper, I critically consider a hypothesis forwarded by several scholars that the early Buddhist texts presuppose the existence of a special type of consciousness (viññāṇa) which is not identical with viññāṇa-khandha, as the counterpart to the aggregates. According to this interpretation, such consciousness is considered pretty much synonymous with nibbāna, the ultimate state of liberation. I argue that despite its value and advantage over the historically dominant interpretation of anattā teaching, this hypothesis is nonetheless problematic on many levels. In the first part of the paper, I consider the textual problems of the hypothesis in question. In particular, I focus on the implications of the Kevaṭṭa Sutta and the Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta as well as on the problematic interrelation of citta and viññāṇa in the Nikāyas. I also argue that the hypothesis of special consciousness as nibbāna is difficult to reconcile with the apophatic approach and strong emphasis on ineffability present in the substantial portion of the Nikāyas. In the final part of the paper, I consider philosophical problems of the theory in question. In particular, I argue that it is difficult to conceive pure transcendental type of consciousness as an agent of attitudes such as clinging or abandoning, thus making it an unlikely candidate for being the counterpart of the aggregates. In order to make better sense of the problems in question, I consider certain parallels of the Nikāya doctrine with modern philosophy of mind as well as with ancient Indian Sāṃkhya doctrine.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2022, 12, 1; 129-146
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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