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Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Granie w historię
Autorzy:
Woźniak, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690020.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Historii im. Tadeusza Manteuffla PAN w Warszawie
Tematy:
historia
kultura
gra
ideał nauki
demokratyzacja historii
mediatyzacja przeszłości
history
culture
play
scientific ideal
democratization of history
the past as seen through the prism of mass media
Opis:
W artykule, zwracając uwagę na metaforyczne uwikłanie pewnych konstrukcji językowych związanych z pojęciem historii – takich jak obecne w tytule granie w historię – próbuję pokazać, że ukazując polityczne, ideologiczne czy kulturowe uwikłanie obrazów przeszłości, stają się one nie tylko odbiciem odmiennego od tradycyjnego wyobrażenia roli/statusu historii i historyka w społeczeństwie. Staram się pokazać, iż związane z tym zjawisko demokratyzacji historii skutkuje nie tyle tym, że dopuszczalne okazują się wszelkie możliwe narracje, których przedmiotem jest przeszłość, ale raczej tym, że wizje te we współczesnej kulturze okazują się być obok – lub nawet zamiast – historiografii akademickiej źródłem mocno zakorzenionych kulturowo obrazów przeszłości.
The phenomenon of a democratization of history lies not so much in the equal status of different narratives about the past as in the society’s willingness to regard them as equally acceptable. In this sense academic historiography is not the only source of the cultural visions of the past. Movies, games, the Internet and other digital media all serve as a platform for creating these visions which, being usually the work of history-loving amateurs rather than professional historians, emerge within the framework of the so called non-conventional history (representations of the past found in movies or literature) or the alternative history (representations of the past found in computer games, historical portals or produced by reconstruction groups). The pluralism of the visions of the past and of ways of representing it turns out to be as much the result of the process of the democratization of history as it does the consequence of the technological possibilities that have emerged in modern culture, the essence of which seems to lie in its audio-visual character. In order to make it possible for history to carry out its cognitive functions, it is necessary not only to reformulate research programmes, which after all is being done, but also to devise new ways of representing the past. This is dictated not only by some key aspects of research practice, which is informed by the post-modernist critique of the traditional forms of practising history, but also by the new cultural context the historiography of today is set in. It is within this context that we may observe both verbal and visual articulations of the view of the past that is alternative to the representations of it in academic historiography. These articulations can be found in a variety of history games. It should also be kept in mind that the benefits of ‘playing at history’ are usually thought of as lying in the realm of education and of the commercialization of history. However, its cognitive potential is usually neglected.
Źródło:
Klio Polska. Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Historiografii Polskiej; 2016, 8
2450-8381
2450-8373
Pojawia się w:
Klio Polska. Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Historiografii Polskiej
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pragmatism and Science
Autorzy:
Marsonet, Michele
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036147.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
Tematy:
Pragmatism
Science
Scientific Realism
Ideal Science
Final Theory
Relativism
Opis:
Logical empiricism gave rise to a powerful paradigm and it took some decades to overthrow it, even though it should be judged respectfully since, after all, philosophy of science and logic as we know them stemmed from that ground. The basic assumptions on which the paradigm of the “received view” rested are essentially the following. In the first place, verificationism seemed almost a truth of faith. Secondly, logical empiricists never offered good arguments in support of their thesis that assertive discourse must be preferred to more pragmatic forms of language. Thirdly, they too easily assumed that something like “objective truth” really exists. Last but certainly not least, the logical empiricists did not fully recognize the historical dimension of the scientific enterprise, which subsequently turned to be something different from the “universal science” they were talking about. In the paper it is argued that scientific realism (and the nature of scientific knowledge at large) is a theme where the originality of pragmatist positions clearly emerge. Nicholas Rescher, for example, claims - against any form of instrumentalism and many postmodern authors as well - that natural science can indeed validate a plausible commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities. Scientific conceptions aim at what really exists in the world, but only hit it imperfectly and “well off the mark”. What we can get is, at most, a rough consonance between our scientific ideas and reality itself. This means that the scientific knowledge at our disposal in any particular moment of the history of mankind must be held to be “putative”, while its relations to the truth (i.e. how things really stand in the world) should be conceived in terms of tentative and provisional estimation. Even the optimistic visions that see science as growingly approaching the “real” truth have, at this point, to be rejected on pragmatic grounds.
Źródło:
Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2013, 08; 101-109
2079-3715
2309-1088
Pojawia się w:
Academicus International Scientific Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Sądy moralne jako konstytutywny element badania naukowego
Moral Judgements as a Constitutive Element of Scientific Research
Autorzy:
Lekka-Kowalik, Agnieszka
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016191.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
ideał nauki wolnej od wartości
nauka jako działanie
struktura badania naukowego
sądy wartościujące
nauki czyste i stosowane
sądy moralne
racjonalność praktyczna i instrumentalna
ideal of value-free science
science as activity
structure of scientific research
value judgements
basic and applied sciences
moral judgements
practical and instrumental rationality
Opis:
The paper aims at answering the question of whether scientists qua scientists pass moral judgements. My answer is: “yes”. I claim that moral judgements are necessary for advancing science and that they may even belong to the content of science. This fact threatens neither rationality nor objectivity of science. On the contrary − pretending that science is morally neutral distorts it. I develop two arguments for my theses. First, against the background of the ideal of value-free science I show that value-judgements are constitutive for science. This ideal is not tenable when we consider science as human activity. By analyzing cases of research I then show that in applied sciences both methodological and moral judgements are necessary for any successful inquiry. The structure of scientific research allows me to extend this claim to science in general. Secondly, by considering science as governed by practical − not instrumental − rationality I show that moral judgements, which evaluate actions constitutive of any research as “permissible”, have their source in this rationality. Without them rationality, freedom, and autonomy of science are endangered.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 2; 91-115
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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