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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    Historia, widma i dekonstrukcja
    History, Spectres, and Deconstruction
    Autorzy:
    Kula, Artur
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2080785.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    deconstruction
    Ethan Kleinberg
    French Theory
    hauntology
    ontological realism
    dekonstrukcja
    realizm ontologiczny
    widmontologia
    Nauki Humanistyczne i Społeczne
    Opis:
    This article is a review of Ethan Kleinberg’s Haunting History. For a Deconstructive Approach to the Past (Stanford, 2017). I focus on three issues related to that work. These are: historians’ attitude towards the deconstruction; the idea of ontological realism and its critique; the role of young historians in modern academia. This text is based not only on the book reviewed but also on its different analyses and ways it was used in other research. In the conclusion, I present how Haunting History can be used as an emancipatory tool by scholars who are starting their academic careers now.
    Źródło:
    Historyka studia metodologiczne; 2020, 50; 157-171
    0073-277X
    Pojawia się w:
    Historyka studia metodologiczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy naturalizm jest prawomocny?
    Is Naturalism Legitimate?
    Autorzy:
    Pobojewska, Aldona
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015776.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    naturalizm
    realizm ontologiczny
    realizm teoriopoznawczy
    paradygmat ontologiczny i mentalistyczny filozofii
    uwarunkowanie podmiotu poznania
    naturalizm jako postawa badawcza
    naturalism
    ontological realism
    epistemological realism
    ontological and mentalistic paradigms of philosophy
    conditioning of the subject of cognition
    naturalism as a research attitude
    Opis:
    Naturalism that I deal with is an approach towards the world, the man and the possibilities and methods of learning about the world. It maintains that there is an existential continuity of reality and this is a continuity of nature and not of other spheres of existence. A view formulated in this way silently accepts the assumptions of ontological realism and epistemological realism. Hence it becomes part of the ontological paradigm of philosophy. After Kant, that is after mentalistic (transcendentalistic) paradigm in philosophy came into being, the legitimacy of the ontological way of philosophising cannot be maintained. Is then naturalism – that at present experiences another revival – only a misunderstanding? Well, no. The limits of its validity – but not legitimacy – are set by science. Within its area it is obvious and useful, perhaps even indispensable. It is a type of unrealised research attitude by whose virtue a scientist treats the object of his studies as autonomously existing and one that can be objectively cognised. However, here he is supported not by theoretical arguments, but first of all by pragmatic and psychological-social ones.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 3; 173-185
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    DWIE KONCEPCJE PRAWDY I DWIE WIZJE ŚWIATA
    TWO NOTIONS OF TRUTH AND TWO CONCEPTS OF THE WORLD
    Autorzy:
    Ziemińska, Renata
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488441.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    prawda
    realizm
    schemat T
    pakiet ontologiczny
    truth
    realism
    T-scheme
    ontological package
    Opis:
    There are two basic notions of truth (objectivism and subjectivism) connected with two understandings of the world (respectively, realism and idealism). Author claims, against deflationists, that the concept of truth is not metaphysically neutral. Tarski’s T-schema requires some metaphysical reading. Reading the schema from the left to the right, leads to realism. Reading the schema from the right to the left, leads to anti-realism. The concept of truth is the part of some ontological package deal or alethic network. There are two basic packages, competing since centuries, that focus on two poles in human cognition: subject and object.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2013, 61, 3; 29-41
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    „Twardy” problem realizmu metafizycznego i współczesny antyrealizm
    The “Hard” Problem of Metaphysical Realism and Contemporary Anti- Realism
    Autorzy:
    Judycki, Stanisław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013061.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    realizm
    idealizm
    antyrealizm
    partycypacja
    zasada immanencji
    dowód ontologiczny
    realism
    idealism
    anti-realism
    participation
    principle of immanence
    ontological proof
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is to consider the problem of metaphysical realism that is defined as the thesis that there are objects that are independent of human consciousness. The problem was not solved by I. Kant, since he assumed, without a justification, that there are objects (“things in themselves”) that are the causes of human mental states. The author interprets the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the so-called principle of immanence (“principle of consciousness”), according to which every entity (object) may be treated exclusively as a correlate of consciousness. The principle of immanence is the cause why even causal relations have to be treated as only certain data for the consciousness, and hence they may not be referred to by asserting that there is a factor that is the cause of states of human consciousness. Contemporary anti-realism, as the so-called conceptual realism, does not consider the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the principle of immanence, and hence it is not a part of the traditional dispute on the existence of the (external) world. The author sees the solution to the problem of metaphysical realism in combining two arguments: in the reference to the ontological proof, which – via God’s veracity – is to “lead outside” the immanence of consciousness, and in the reference to the concept of participation in such a way that the human mind participates in God and it is Him that is the real entity (ens realissimum) that is referred to by the dispute about the existence of the world and the problem of metaphysical realism.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2009, 57, 1; 49-74
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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