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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    Preliminaries to the Study of Morality and Law
    Autorzy:
    Znamierowski, Czesław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1832031.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-09-15
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    theory of law
    universal benevolence
    moral judgements
    Opis:
    The paper is an English translation of Rozważania wstępne do nauki o moralności i prawie by Czesław Znamierowski published originally in Polish by PWN Publishing House in 1966. The text is published as a part of a jubilee edition of the “Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review. 100th Anniversary of the Faculty of Law and Administration” devoted to the achievements of the late Professors of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań.
    Źródło:
    Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review; 2019, 10; 85-110
    2450-0976
    Pojawia się w:
    Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Natura jako naturalna granica naturalizmu
    Nature as a Natural Limit of Naturalism
    Autorzy:
    Lekka-Kowalik, Agnieszka
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015775.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    nauka jako działanie
    badania naukowe
    paradygmat naturalistyczny
    manipulacja genetyczna
    sądy moralne
    normatywny wymiar natury
    science as action
    scientific research
    naturalistic paradigm
    genetic manipulation
    moral judgements
    normative dimension of nature
    Opis:
    At first glance naturalism seems to be an integral part of contemporary science. For science there exist only those phenomena which can be examined with scientific methods (an ontological thesis), and any explanation of those phenomena must appeal only to natural causes, i.e. to structures, processes and regularities underlying those phenomena, and not to any supernatural forces (a methodological thesis). If we look at naturalism as a paradigm of doing science, a pattern that determines what and how should be investigated, some limits of this paradigm show itself. When doing experiments, scientists sometimes meet moral prohibitions of treating certain obviously natural objects in certain ways. This fact may be interpreted as a product of social evolution which science is entitled to ignore, for it can change in the process of further evolution, or as an external factor which science should not ignore under the peril of losing social support. None of these interpretation does justice to some basic facts about science (including the fact that social support was never withdrawn regardless of well known cases of immoral scientific practices). The prohibition of treating certain natural objects in certain ways may also be interpreted as a consequence of discovering the moral dimension of nature understood as the essence of things. Yet, the normative dimension of nature cannot be investigated with scientific methods. Thus, for a consistent naturalist it does not exist; and even more − following moral prohibitions could be seen as detrimental for science in cases where morality prohibits applying the most effective scientific methods. It seems however that no scientist defends the reduction of scientific ethics to scientific methodology. In this sense the nature-essence of things practically limits naturalism seen as a paradigm of doing science. The paper argues for the above thesis in three steps: (1) various meanings of the terms “nature”, “natural”, and “naturalism” are presented; (2) it is shown in what sense contemporary science is unnatural but naturalistic; (3) a case where science “meets” moral prohibitions concerning natural beings − producing transgenic animals − is discussed. It is then shown that any interpretation of these prohibitions consistent with the naturalistic paradigm cannot be maintained, whereas the interpretation which recognizes the moral dimension of nature-essence does justice to facts and intuitions concerning this case.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 3; 187-195
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Sądy moralne jako konstytutywny element badania naukowego
    Moral Judgements as a Constitutive Element of Scientific Research
    Autorzy:
    Lekka-Kowalik, Agnieszka
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016191.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2001
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    ideał nauki wolnej od wartości
    nauka jako działanie
    struktura badania naukowego
    sądy wartościujące
    nauki czyste i stosowane
    sądy moralne
    racjonalność praktyczna i instrumentalna
    ideal of value-free science
    science as activity
    structure of scientific research
    value judgements
    basic and applied sciences
    moral judgements
    practical and instrumental rationality
    Opis:
    The paper aims at answering the question of whether scientists qua scientists pass moral judgements. My answer is: “yes”. I claim that moral judgements are necessary for advancing science and that they may even belong to the content of science. This fact threatens neither rationality nor objectivity of science. On the contrary − pretending that science is morally neutral distorts it. I develop two arguments for my theses. First, against the background of the ideal of value-free science I show that value-judgements are constitutive for science. This ideal is not tenable when we consider science as human activity. By analyzing cases of research I then show that in applied sciences both methodological and moral judgements are necessary for any successful inquiry. The structure of scientific research allows me to extend this claim to science in general. Secondly, by considering science as governed by practical − not instrumental − rationality I show that moral judgements, which evaluate actions constitutive of any research as “permissible”, have their source in this rationality. Without them rationality, freedom, and autonomy of science are endangered.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 2; 91-115
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Dlaczego nauka nie może być wolna od wartości
    Why Science cannot be Value-free
    Autorzy:
    Lekka-Kowalik, Agnieszka
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015633.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2004
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    nauka wolna od wartościowań
    metoda naukowa
    sądy wartościujące
    wartości poznawcze
    wartości moralne
    „tłuste” pojęcia etyczne
    dychotomia fakt/wartość
    value-free science
    scientific method
    value judgements
    cognitive values
    moral values
    „thick” ethical concepts
    fact/value dichotomy
    Opis:
    Three arguments are developed to support this thesis: (1) Since there is no algorithm for making methodological decisions as to what theory should be accepted, what method should be used, etc, scientists have to pass judgements that are essentially evaluative. Those judgements belong to science. The attempt to save the ideal of value-free science by distinguishing value-free object language and value-laden metalanguage (in which those evaluative judgements would be formulated) does not work. For there are no reasons to expel the methodology of a given science from that science, and even if we made this move, we would finally come to the level of evaluative judgements, unless we accept regressus ad infinitum. (2) Even if the above distinction were tenable, this would not save the ideal of value-free science. For our language is full of the so-called „thick ethical concepts” that are both descriptive and evaluative. They are justifiably used at least in some sciences. We could exclude – by definition - such concepts from science, but this would result in expelling many legitimate disciplines from the realm of science. This would mean not that science was value--free but that we made it so. (3) The fact that scientific results are sometimes expressed by means of ethically thick concepts does not allow us to restrict values involved in science to epistemological values – moral values are involved as well. Moreover, apparently pure methodological concepts such as „good solution” or „sufficient evidence” seem to be also „ethically thick”. Such considerations allow us to draw a conclusion that science possesses intrinsic moral dimension, and separating the epistemic and moral points of view in discussions about science is unjustified.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 275-293
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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