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Wyszukujesz frazę "future truth" wg kryterium: Temat

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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Absolutyzm logiczny a ontologia
    Absolutism and Ontology
    Autorzy:
    Wilk, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31343642.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
    Tematy:
    determinizm
    indeterminizm
    prawda o przyszłości
    Kazimierz Twardowski
    Jan Łukasiewicz
    Stanisław Leśniewski
    Willard von Orman Quine
    Donald Davidson
    Georg Henrik von Wright
    determinism
    indeterminism
    future truth
    Twardowski
    Kotarbiński
    Łukasiewicz
    Leśniewski
    Quine
    Davidson
    von Wright
    Opis:
    Tekst jest poświęcony związkowi między logiką a ontologią w kontekście problemu prawdziwości zdań o przyszłości. Jednym z rozważanych problemów jest „niewrażliwość” logiki klasycznej na ontologiczny problem determinizm-indeterminizm.
    The text considers the link between logic and ontology in the context of the problem of future truth. The main issue examined in this paper is the following one: the classical logic is strongly insensitive to the ontological determinism-indeterminism problem.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia i Nauka; 2017, 5; 289-297
    2300-4711
    2545-1936
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia i Nauka
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Problem prawdy u Wilhelma z Owernii
    The problem of truth according to William of Auvergne
    Autorzy:
    Pawlikowski, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/496287.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Towarzystwo Naukowe Franciszka Salezego
    Tematy:
    Medieval Philosophy
    Truth
    Future Contingents
    Metaphysics
    Logic
    Opis:
    William of Auvergne (1180–1249) was one of the first wave professors of University in Paris to engage with Greek, Islamic and Jewish philosophical writings that had become available in Latin translation. He was the author of a vast work that he calls the Magisterium divinale (Teaching on God). De universo (On the Universe), written in the 1230s, is the most philosophical treatise of the Magisterium. One short part (I, 3, 25-26) of this treatise includes a very important philosophical topic – the problem of truth. Based on a doctrine of Avicenna, William formulated one of the forms of truth's classical definition. In his view, this definition express the essence of logical truth, which is constituted in any relation between human intellect and things, if intellect is adequate to his object. So the logical truth is a basis and property of true judgments and statements about all real things, and even about what really does not exist (things in the future, in the past, non-beings, negations), and – generally – about all the man can think or about everything possible to thinking. William rejects the doctrine of St. Augustine, who taught that every truth has its source in the First Truth identified with God the Creator of all things and intellects contingent. William argues that only actually existing things are real existing as caused by God. So only actually existing things can be substrates of truth and so subjects of true judgments and statements. The Creator doesn't cause things as existing in the past, in the future, but as existing in the present. What is more, He doesn't cause non-beings and negations. In consequence, William recognizes logical truth as the only justification for true adjudication of all what exists and doesn't exist. In Steven P. Marrone's opinion William's theory of truth is a new idea in the early thirteenth century. He believes that William's theory, however incomplete, explains how much the problem of truth is depended on logic rather than metaphysics, so that it could be separated radically from questions of being and viewed independently of the issue concerning the relation of the mind and creatures to God. In fact, although William continued to speak in traditional terms, he divorced with the point of view of ontology and natural theology, finding solutions in theories of logic and language. However, taken in this article studies seem to show that William's theory of truth is embedded in a metaphysical context. Furthermore, medieval logic is the science of the action of the intellect, which is a faculty of human being. This is not logic in twentieth-century's sense. Thus, it does not seem to William resigned from metaphysics to logic. His theory of logical truth is imperfect because of metaphysical errors. The main error is that the logical truth, which realizes in the relation of intellect to things and so is one of truths that exist in contingent beings, William considered as final and the sole basis of every true judgments and statements, without regard to its dependence on the First Truth. Indeed, logical truth is not able to truly independent existence.
    Źródło:
    Seminare. Poszukiwania naukowe; 2012, 31; 87-102
    1232-8766
    Pojawia się w:
    Seminare. Poszukiwania naukowe
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The epistemic status of propositions of future events
    Autorzy:
    Ukagba, George
    Odia, Sylvester Idemudia
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423316.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    future
    truth
    correspondence theory
    idea of progress
    Opis:
    The advent of society with its built in idea of progress by collective effort has led to tremendous human growth and development. Our today is more of our planned yesterday rather than by accident of nature. In spite of the vast unknown future before us, our today is largely as planned yesterday. To this extent we can say we know tomorrow taken as our planned and determined-to-achieve future. We know when to guess and make predictions of the future. We also know what we want our future to be and how to work towards realizing it. As humans we keep learning and broadening our horizons. Though today is to a large extent as we planned of it yesterday, we will still find room for improvement. This should not be taken to mean that we did not know today as planned from yesterday. It is human to want something better. So we have knowledge of our planned and determined-to-achieve future events in so far as we do not have at the moment any reason to think otherwise.
    Źródło:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2014, 26; 393-405
    0860-4487
    Pojawia się w:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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