Od realizmu do arealizmu (II). Realizm epistemologiczny przez lingwistyczne okulary

In this article I demonstrate that philosophy illuminated by the Linguistic Turn is no better suited to solve the epistemological problem of realism than was transcendental epistemology. The bulk of this paper concerns a polemic with Hintikka's vision of the relation between model-theoretic semantics and the epistemological problem of realism. In this polemic I argue for three points: (1) Hintikka's assumption that there is a fundamental opposition between two visions of language, the view of language as a medium of communication and the view of it as a calculus, is mistaken. I demonstrate that the latter vision of language presupposes the former one, (2) Hintikka's argument for the thesis that the view of language as a medium of communication constitutes the common source of the troublesome thesis of ineffability of semantics and semantic universalism is faulty. I demonstrate that the source of both beliefs lies in the unwarranted assumption that logical semantics against Hintikka is that logical semantics should not be interpreted as a new tool for solving the old epistemological problem.