EXISTENTIAL EXPERIENCE LIKE ILLNESS: A CASE STUDY OF GILBERT JONAS

The works of the philosophers of existence often address illness and health in the context of a (difficult to describe) existential experience. In this paper I will argue the following thesis: one of the strategies chosen by the authors whose aim is to characterise an existential experience is to present it by referring to the category of illness. This strategy involves, first and foremost, presenting the similarity between the existential experience and an illness; while at the same time, emphasising that the existential experience is not an illness (although of course, the existential experience may be a consequence of experiencing an illness). To support my basic thesis, I will draw from the works of Albert Camus, Lev Shestov and other philosophers of existence, as well as from literary works. In the article, I will provide an interpretation of Albert Camus’ short story “Jonas, or the Artist at Work”. I will discuss the basic characteristics of the existential experience, focusing on those that are similar to the symptoms of illness. I will also formulate a number of general remarks which concern the existential experience.