The “Rule of Law” and the “Rechtsstaat”: A Historical and Theoretical Approach from a German Perspective

The Rule of Law, understood in its most general and original meaning as an absence of arbitrariness in state power, is not merely one legal principle amongst many, but has been the core of law itself in political philosophy since classical Antiquity. Although the Rule of Law has been given substance to in various different ways since the modern era, the Member States of the European Union (EU) have contractually agreed in Article 2 first sentence of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on a Rule of Law that is an expression of the community of values within the EU. This is now not just politically but legally binding for all EU Member States, regardless of changing political majorities or national legislative acts within the Member States. However, with the recent initiation of proceedings against Poland and Hungary, to investigate the potential “risk of serious breach” of EU values according to Article 7 para. 1 of the TEU, it has become very clear that there is no longer political consensus amongst the governments of the EU Member States with regard to how the principle of the Rule of Law should be given substance to in practice. It will thus be the task of jurisprudence, not of politics, to ascertain how far-reaching the legal obligation with regard to the “value” of the “Rule of Law” on the basis of Article 2 of the TEU is and where – beyond the scope of European Law – the political prerogative for Member States to act in accordance with their own national circumstances begins.