Chińska Republika Ludowa wobec problemu pokojowego rozwiązania konfliktu kambodżańskiego

From the very beginning of the Cambodian conflict China was exerting profound influence on its course. China also to large extent decided upon forms of its resolution. The Chinese policy towards Cambodia was rational in the sense that it was coherent with the most important segments of the Chinese international political strategy, namely bilateral relations with the great powers (US, USSR) and the strengthening of China's own military and political presence in the region, and that ideological factors played a minor role in formulating that policy. During the US war with Vietnam China developed amicable relations with Cambodia despite its monarchical form of government, since it wanted the government in Phnom Penh to allow Vietnamese troops to use Cambodian territory as a convenient transportation route linking southern and northern parts of Vietnam. Beijing sup- ported the ultra-left government of Pol Pot not because of any ideological affinity between two governments but rather because the Khmer Rouge government by opposing Vietnamese communists could check for some time expansionist aspirations of Vietnamese and their close allies from the Soviet Union. The same reasons stood behind the Chinese policy in the 80s. Under the aegis of China new anti-Vietnamese Cambodian government in exile was established. China lent military support to the Khmer Rouge resistance forces and secured their key role in the process of reaching political accommodation of the conflict. After the restoration of Cambodian monarchy in 1993 with the strength of Khmer Rouge dwindling and the post-communists Cambodian People's Party becoming more powerful China changed its political sympathies in favour of CPP. Close and friendly Sino-Cambodian relationships may now positively contribute to Chinese efforts of securing its key transportation links and reinforcing its military presence in the Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Thailand.