Interpretacja rozszerzająca

This essay discusses the issue of a broadening interpretation in the light of legal practice and study of the language. Speaking about the broadening interpretation, the term “interpretation” refers to the result of interpreting an expression. To label the outcome as a result of broadening interpretation, one has to compare it with another outcome – the scope of reference. Claims commonly formulated in legal literature suggest that the scope of reference for broadening interpretation derives from the “pure language” and does not require deeper consideration or implications. On the other hand, broadening interpretation, according to the definitions, expands the meaning of the text beyond its language and is associated with inferences which may be drawn from purposes or other indicators of the legislator’s intention. This essay presents the construction of broadening interpretation, which more closely corresponds to the legal practice. The goal of the essay is to show that broadening interpretation does not completely distort the language in which the legal text was formulated. Both the scope of reference and the wider scope (the extensive interpretation) are inevitably linked to the implications and inferences based on the legal text’s language and can vary basically in the range of permissible conclusions that can prove wider in the case of broadening interpretation and as to the result which is obviously wider in the case of extensive interpretation. The implications we find in, and draw from, the legal text’s language are influenced by our tendency to attribute purpose to whatever we read.