Zmiany instytucji ogólnych w procesie transformacji a zaszłości historyczne (na przykładzie praw własności nieruchomości)

In transition countries a particular type of institutional change had place, namely exogenous imposition of generał rules in order to constitute market economy relations. Thus the theoretical mechanisms of step-wise evolution are irrelevant and self- reinforcement of institutions is rather a barrier to the introduction of new rules. Diachronic (path-dependent) relations are prevailing, and synchronic discordance is highly probable. Those mechanisms have been analysed on the example of a part of essential systemie rules, namely property rights concerning real estate. Property rights in this field are subject to numerous ideological conflicts (between property protection and re-privatisation, between privatisation at any price and the principle of a fair price, between the commercial principles of drawing rent and respect of social rights). Ali those principles are historically rooted, but the laws they generate are necessarily asynchronic. The conflicts thus revealed have been frequently solved by “backward moves” (withdrawal of some rules). Nevertheless the interests of those who acquired property over transition and the additional costs the agents would have to bear in the case of essential change of institutional framework (compensations to the historical owners, for instance) create a new self-reinforcing mechanisms around the rules already introduced.