Extension of Critical Programs of the Computational Theory of Mind

Technological advances in computer science have secured the computer metaphor status of a heuristic methodological tool used to answer the question about the nature of mind. Nevertheless, some philosophers strongly support opposite opinions. Anti-computationalism in the philosophy of mind is a methodological program that uses extremely heterogeneous grounds for argumentation, deserving analysis and discussion. This article provides an overview and interpretation of the traditional criticism of the computational theory of mind (computationalism); its basic theses have been formed in Western philosophy in the last quarter of the 20th century. The main goal is to reveal the content of the arguments of typical anti-computationalist programs and expand their application to the framework of the semantic problems of the Classic Computational Theory of Mind. The main fault of the symbolic approach in the classical computationalism is the absence of a full-fledged theory of semantic properties. The relevance of considering these seemingly outdated problems is justified by the fact that the problem of meaning (and general problems of semantics) remains in the core of the latest developments in various areas of AI and the principles of human-computer interaction.