Problem neutralności aksjologicznej nauk społecznych : perspektywa klasycznego racjonalizmu

The aim of this study is to draw a distinction between two kinds of an assertion that social science should be a “value-free” science. The first one states that social science should not be interfered by political, philosophical, moral or religious convictions and prejudices of scientists. Science ought to be based on reliable data only and scientists have to leave their ideologies behind the door. Descriptive social science should not to be reduced to apportioning praise or blame among the actors on the political scene. In this „ideological sense” social science is and ought to be non-evaluating. The second kind of the assertion says that in the process of forming concepts for descriptive social science we not only need but also must rely on some more or less conscious evaluation of social phenomena. This „must” is derived for instance from the necessity of making a decision which kind of phenomena counts as for example: law, state, leadership etc. The most rational and efficient way of making such kind of choice is to based social science on consideration of practical philosophy. In this „conceptual sense” social science is not and it should not to be valuefree. This essay develops an argumentation for such understanding of a problem of axiological neutrality in social science and by doing this represents the tradition of classical rationalism in thinking about human affairs.