Milczenie jako performatywny akt przestępczy na przykładzie polskiego Kodeksu karnego

In the paper, the theory of John L. Austin’s speech acts is juxtaposed with the theory of crime functioning in the Polish criminal law science. The aim of the study was to answer the question whether silence in the light of criminal law can be understood as equivalent to an act of speech, which is at the same time a criminal act, and therefore has negative legal consequences for the perpetrator. The defi nition of the framework for the criminal law performativity of silence was based on an analysis of a fundamental act of criminal law in Poland – the Criminal Code of 1997. Then an attempt was made to create a typology of crimes of silence penalised in this Code. The paper emphasises the role of silence as a fully autonomous executive form of crimes, and thus its importance from the perspective of the society and the state.