Arystotelesowsko-tomistyczna koncepcja animacji a współczesne spory bioetyczne

The content of the paper is a philosophical analysis of Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of animation as a way to describe the essence of human life. The analysis is philosophical, because its aim does not consist in purely historical inquiry, but in establishment of correct conception of human life. The paper also shows that the classical dilemma between immediate and delayed animation is not anachronical quarrel, but the stances in it are analogous to the contemporary bioethical views on such problems as moral permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. According to the new interpretation Aristotle was a proponent of immediate animation and Aquinas was opting for some form of delayed animation. The critique of these stances has shown their problematic implications and their incompatibility with contemporary scientific knowledge. The aim of proposed modification is both to avoid these flaws and to maintain the essence of the classical conception. The argumentation shows that human life cannot be identified with the potentiality to perform the functions that are specific to human beings, because that potentiality can be ascribed also to the beings other than humans (e.g. reproductive cells). Human existence cannot be identified neither with the acts of reason, because it would lead to denial of the status of human being not only to the embryo and the fetus, but also to the people in their sleep. The correct conception of human life must involve both the existence of a being that has some biological individuality (a member of a specie Homo sapiens) and the potentiality to perform the acts of reason. If (as Aristotle claimed) in case of human being the act of vegetative faculty is also an act of the human soul, then a human being who performs act of that faculty also performs an act of a rational soul. Therefore he maintains its identity as a subject, although in the very moment he doesn’t perform what is most specific to the subject.