Znaczenie introspekcyjne: metafizyczne aspekty semantyki

Mental meaning (mental contents) is not a particular kind of object, but it is the way a conscious human mind works. By `meaning' the author understands here both the extralinguistic meaning (perceptive, imaginary, etc.) and the so-called linguistic meaning. In both these senses meaning has the following properties: it is translinguistic, general, abstract, regularly interrelated, subject to modifications (extending, complementing and erasing its components), subject to schematization, it may be transferred to various physical foundations, it may be illustrated, it is directly accessible in introspection and accessible for many subjects (intersubjective). When approached negatively, meaning as a way of functioning of a conscious human mind cannot be identified with a physical sign (be it in the sense of specimen, or in the sense of type). It is neither an ideal object, nor a real one. Also, it is no kind of a perception stereotype. It is not an idea associated with a word, if idea is understood as either an image or a visual schema. Mental meaning is not a communication meaning, as the speaker may modify the meanings he found as existing ones, but he cannot create them. The author considers the following theories of meaning as insufficient: the theory, according to which meaning is an idea associated with the word and the theories saying that meaning may be identified with the conditions of truthfulness, the way phrases are used in colloquial language, or with communication meaning. Meaning is also not explained by such theories as semantics of conceptual roles, causal-historical theories, causal and teleological theories. Plato's theory saying that existence of mental meaning in the mind consists in exemplification in the mind of ideally existing properties is considered a correct one that explains mental meaning. The source of meaning in the mind is existence of ideal qualities outside the mind. A correct solution to the problem of the nature and origin of meaning may also be Aristotle's theory of obstraction, according to which the mind, beginning with individual objects and their properties, formulates meantal contents (meaning). Both these theories have to assume that the mind is also capable of performing the operation of transformation that converts properties existing (in a real or ideal way) outside the mind into a peculiarly mental mode of existence. In the case of Aristotle's theory this transformation consists in dematerialization, whereas in the case of Plato's theory transformation is tantamount to converting an ideal being into a mental existence. Additionally, the author suggests that in order to explain the intersubjective character of meaning one has to refer to a form of metaphysical harmonization of particular minds' action. From the semantic way of acting of the human mind one may also make inferences concerning its way of existence. Translinguisticallity, generality, abstraction and other features of human semantic consciousness allow the statement that functioning of human mind does not consist in purely material actions. This immaterial character, however, does not have to be understood as a thesis about the existence of some mysterious `spiritual material' of which human mind is made. It seems that immateriality has to be interpreted as radical extra-materiality.