Teodycea bez unde malum? Marilyn McCord Adams odpowiedź na problem zła

The aim of this paper is to present the main strands of the Marilyn M. Adams’s response to the problem of evil in contrast with the mainstream of the analytic theodicy. The most important difference between the standard analytic attitude to the problem of evil and that proposed by Adams is that she abandons the question about God’s reasons i.e. goods which could be morally sufficient reasons for permitting bad states of affairs to occur, especially instances of apparently pointless suffering (so-called gratuitous evils). Adams concentrates on the problem of horrendous evils i.e. evils which constitute a threat to the meaning of one’s life and prima facie undercut all positive value of one’s existence. Adams, inspired by the French thinker Simone Weil, seeks the resolution of the problem of evil in the crucified Christ’s identification with sufferers (and also in the idea of universal salvation). In the paper I analyse some weaknesses of the Adams’s theodicy, esp. I raise a query if we can give up the oldest question about evil: unde malum.