Problem mentalese

In the present article I critically analyze the conception of the “language of thought” formulated by J. Fodor, and I suggest a solution of the question of the relation between the language and thought that refers to the studies of intentionality conducted by E. Husserl. I argue that our (mono-subjective) thinking is not reducible to the language (especially understood in the cybernetic way), and mental processes that we usually recognize as verbalized ones, are in fact operations on specific intentional forms that are not language units at all, but are our formulation of phrases (spoken, written, and so on). I question both the physicalist view of the issue of internalization of the language and the use of it in mental processes, and the position that perceives these processes as exclusively (or first of all) linguistic ones. According to the conception I suggest the natural language is intentionally transformed, de-verbalized, by the subject, and the intentional forms, by means of which the subject of cognition performs acts of “linguistic” thinking, have a subjective character, analogous to the intentional forms that take part in processes of recognizing external objects. The subject does not assume a metalinguistic attitude in the acts of thinking, but an attitude directed to the objects it thinks about. This objective character is also revealed in communicating with other subjects, and it does not have (as is usually assumed) the character of coding/decoding the message, but is an interpretation of defined objective domains, that is objects, that are the theme of the subjects’ communication.