Pluralizm racjonalności i pluralistyczna krytyka imparcjalizmu

The article aims to present and critically analyze one of the currents of thought within the framework of deliberative democracy. The main dispute that we identify in the framework of this theory is the dispute between the impartialist and pluralistic approach. The role of reason towards the phenomenon of pluralism is the subject of these discussions. The impartialists base their arguments above all on the idea of public reason, while pluralists deny its value to other values. It can therefore be concluded that this dispute consists in opposing the rationality of pluralism to the pluralism of rationality. In addition to analyzing the arguments of the pluralist approach, we also focus on the criticism of the impartialism that these positions have put forward. The article distinguishes three possible forms of pluralism: rationality of pluralism, plurality of rationality prima facie and plurality of rationality sensu proprio. This allows us to show the relationship between impartialism (rationality of pluralism) and pluralism (plurality of rationalities prima facie) and the plurality of pluralism proposed by the critics of impartiality (plurality of rationalities prima facie) with a specific form of pluralism (plurality of rationality sensu proprio). In addition, in the article we identify the directives which pluralists propose to take place of public reason. The pluralistic approach which we analyze in the text is presented by such authors as: Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib, Chantal Mouffe, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. The impartialist tradition should be associated with John Rawles and his interpreters and critics such as Joshua Cohen and Brian Barry.