Elita sądownictwa w III RP na początku procesu przemiany i destabilizacji

Tematem książki jest polska elita sądownictwa, jej autonomia, rola i zasoby w latach 1997-2015, w fazie względnej stabilizacji. Analizy prowadzono na trzech poziomach: państwa i jego instytucji, elit oraz ich relacji z innymi elitami, a także działań osób - przedstawicieli tych elit. Empiryczna weryfikacja opierała się na socjologicznych badaniach terenowych przeprowadzonych z wykorzystaniem techniki wywiadów pogłębionych z przedstawicielami najwyższych instytucji sądowych w Polsce: Sądu Najwyższego, Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Podejście to nadało książce charakter interdyscyplinarny: refleksji metodologicznej i teoretycznej towarzyszą liczne nawiązanie do socjologii polityki oraz prawa. Badania pokazały, że polskie elity sądownictwa w potransformacyjnym okresie III RP nie były dostatecznie autonomiczne – szczególnie wobec elit politycznych. Na podstawie wypowiedzi badanych sędziów trudno ocenić skalę zjawiska swoistej oligarchizacji władzy sądowniczej w Polsce, ale z przedstawianych narracji wynika, że problem ten istniał.

Elites are vital elements of the contemporary state’s and democracy’s performances. They, among others, determine the directions of the state's development, exercise power over society, take care of citizens' security and compete for power with other state elites. The subject of book is the Polish elite of the judiciary, its autonomy, and resources in contemporary Poland. The scholarly literature has neglected the topic of elite and democracy due to the relatively short history of the Third Polish Republic and the significant role of political elites in the initial phase the Polish liberal democracy’ development. The research results presented in the book are intended to fill this gap. Polish democracy between 1997 and 2015 was in the phase of relative stabilization referring to the rules that regulate the state’s essential functions. In this phase, the judicial elites rather than political ones should have played a more significant role. The primary purpose of the book thesis was to explore the characteristics of the judicial elite and the range of its autonomy that are defined by the theory of democratic elites. In order to achieve the research goal, the deliberations were conducted on three levels: the state and its institutions, elites and their relations with other elites and finally the actions of social actors - representatives of elites. Each level corresponds with different goals and objectives: • Analysis at the state level allowed presenting the functioning of the most important institutions of the judiciary in Poland, its social and political functions, and the concepts on which the judges' institutions were erected and which legitimize their existence. • The elites’ perspective provided the knowledge about the position of the judiciary elites in the system, their autonomy in contemporary Polish democracy and normatively regulated boundaries of autonomy and relations with other elites. • And finally, the analysis of the narrative of the Polish elite of the judiciary and other (political and expert) allowed to examine the perception of regulations relating to the judiciary's autonomy and its role in the Polish liberal democracy. The third level of analysis is an empirical verification of the assumptions and conclusions from the previous two and requires additional explanation. It is based on sociological field studies using in-depth interview techniques. Interviews were conducted with representatives of the highest judicial institutions in Poland: the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Constitutional Tribunal. Interviews with representatives of the elite of the judiciary and others (political and expert) were conducted from June 2016 to May 2017. The time in which interviews were conducted and analyzed coincided with the intense work of the new government (established by the Law and Justice party) on changes in the judiciary. The context of the study marked the respondents' statements who, under the influence of current political events, formulated their biased opinions. Probably also due to the judicial reform plans, politicians from the Law and Justice party and politicians representing the government refused to participate in this study. Political activities accompanying the research are also an example of unstable relations between the judiciary and the political elite in Poland. As shown by the study, the Polish elites of the judiciary in the post-transformation period of the Third Polish Republic were not sufficiently autonomous, especially towards political elites. Despite attempts to increase their independence, they did not achieve the intended results in this respect. Indeed, a certain range of autonomy of the judicial elite has always existed. Primarily, the judge interprets the law and issues the decisions independently. It is approved by the general consent of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (which is most dependent on the political elites) that politicians did not attempt to influence the work of the judges, and the judges were able to distance themselves from the political environment that chose them as the judges of the constitutional court. Also, the examples of the political elite trying to directly influence the work and decisions of the judges of the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court have not been recognized. In addition to independence in the interpretation of the law by the judges of the supreme courts (NSA and SN) and other judges of the lower court, the judges' environment in the post-transformation period had one important resource for autonomy: selection processes for judges' positions, including elite judges' positions. In accordance with the concept of the relative autonomy of the elites, this resource was located profoundly in the institution named the National Council of the Judiciary. During the research, the institution was entirely independent of the political elite. Although the political elite had its representation, it was insignificant in numbers and incapable of affecting the balance of power between politicians and judges in the institution itself. The actual power over the selection process of judges for posts was held by judges who chose the majority of members to the National Judicial Council. The composition of the institution (a homogeneous group of the profession), challenges its democratic character. Based on the statements made by the judges in the interviews, it is not easy to assess the scale of the phenomenon of oligarchisation of the judiciary in Poland. However, the presented narrative of judges approves that the problem exists.