Czym jest introspekcja? Badanie rozwiązań pluralistycznych

One of the most common visions in respect to introspection is represented by the so-called inner-sense (or inner-perception) model. But there are some good reasons to consider this model unsuitable. However, nowadays there are a few scholars (e.g. Armstrong) who defend it still. In this paper, I mention also other approaches to introspection (first of all, such as self-fulfillment, self-shaping, and self-expression approaches). But the primary goal of the paper is to defend a pluralist approach to introspection that allows us to examine introspection as involving many mental processes. In this model, a historical context and a phenomenological experience are engaged, too. It is not a quite new position. I discuss some (re)presentations of the pluralist approach. For instance, I reject Schwitzgebel’s solution as too radical and I support the direction proposed by Prinz.