Meaning before Subjectivity: The Primäre Sprache of the Tractatus

I defend an interpretation of the Tractatus based on the following three theses: 1) The Wittgenstein’s work offers a double-layered vision of language, similar to the vision developed during his brief phenomenological period. 2) The so-called Tractarian ontology is actually a purely formal construction, entailed by the structure of what we shall refer to as the inner layer of language. 3) It should be recognized that the metaphysical residuum within the early Wittgenstein’s thought is a certain minimal form of transcendentalism, according to which language – or strictly speaking its ore – performs the function of the transcendental subject for itself. A crucial element of my position is the conclusion that, according to the Tractarian conception of language, the meaning of propositions is not only independent of empirical subjects, but also the condition of their possibility. This amounts to a resolute adaptation of Frege’s principled anti-psychologism on Wittgenstein’s part.