Teza Laudana a internalizm teorii indukcji Jaakko Hintikki

In his Science and Values Laudan claims that „the central problem” that theories of induction were to face between 1950’s and 1970’s was „the impressively high degree of agreement in science”. With regard to Hintikka’s theory of induction I try to refute the Laudan thesis, which entails the externalist interpretation of the Hintikka’s theory of induction. The argument I develop in the text is to show that: a) none of the problems the Hintikka’s theory deals with is identical with the problem recognized by Laudan as „central”; b) Hintikka does not endavour to build the theory of knowledge based on the concept of probability; c) what Hintikka seems to aim at is a formal theory of induction, which will be complimentary to the theory of deduction. Hintikka’s attempts to overcome Carnap’s problems with confirmation of generalizations, and to account for enumerative, eliminative induction and analogy in the theory, as well as the formal aparatus he employs support my argument.