Poczucie powinności moralnej jako odkrywanie własnej tożsamości w kontekście religijnego milczenia

The sense of moral obligation as a disclosure of identity in the context of keeping silent for religious purposes This article is in the form of a diptych: for both presentational and conceptual purposes it falls into two parts that complement each other. The sense of moral obligation (considered with reference to the case of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant), and that of moral dissatisfaction with oneself associated with it, are experiences common to humanity in general that also perhaps serve more than any others to convince us of the existence of our unique personal identity. Such a disclosure of our identity is born from within the inner quietude of a human being, in their conscience, which requires a state of such quietude if it is to speak out from within us. We shall present such a disclosure of human identity here in the form of a number of overlapping theoretico-practical moves conducted at the level of thought, firstly in predominantly philosophical terms (the logos of philosophy), then with a balance maintained between religion and philosophy (the logos of the Christian religion and that of philosophy), and finally and centrally in a predominantly religious context (Christianity). The discovery of one’s identity via the perspective of moral obligation, with its two elements (one fixed, the other changeable), has been formulated verbally thus: “I know that I should, so...” The first element takes us nowhere, with “I know that I should” just reflecting one’s awareness of moral obligation. The second, however, sets us on a path, reflecting as it does the context in which moral consciousness contributes to discovering and experiencing the truth about a human being and his or her identity. In the first part of the diptych, this context is found to consist in the following: (1) personal identity seen in the light of the logos of philosophy; (2) religious identity seen in the light of the logos of religion and mysticism; (3) dialogical identity seen in the light of the logos of philosophy and religion; (4) identity seen in the light of the logos of the Christian religion, construed as not threatened by the philosophy of Kant; (5) identity seen in the light of the philosophy of Kant, construed as having nothing to fear from Christianity; (6) identity seen in the light of the philosophy of Kant, with the latter construed as someone grateful to God for what he has not revealed to us; (7) identity seen in the light of the criticism that Kant’s logos fails to allow for the sincerity of Christian prayer.