Logika Dignāgi – problemy interpretacji

In the article an example of logic and epistemology of the Buddhist philosopher Dignaga indicates some limitations of both standard logic languages and adequacy of basic epistemological concepts: meaning and truth. Contrary to the methodological lines suggested by Łukasiewicz and Schayer, the structure of inference schema anumāna is not determined by truth-functional operator between sentences. Semantic inference structure is determined by generic name, relation qualifications on the basis of distributive or collective class. The Buddhist inference can not be reflected by the relationship between a cause and an effect. The recognition of the thesis is the result of applying the operation to the exclusion (apoha) of other meanings for the hetu premise. At the level of syntax, the cognitive act of agreement with the thesis of inference (based on the exclusion of other meanings for the hetu) is expressed with the ablative case (separation) by the suffix “-at”.