Procesy wyjścia z inwestycji funduszy private equity w warunkach asymetrii informacji

The primary purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the duality of the situation of private equity funds, which takes place in the process of investment. The first situation concerns the agency problem in private equity investments, while the latter refers to the information asymmetry. Furthermore this article points to the impact of principal – agent relationship and asymmetric information on the process of divestment. These two issues helps to better understand and comprehensively present the specifics of private equity investment processes. Possibility of resolving the agency dilemma and ability to minimize the degree of information asymmetry between the parties to the transaction affect the length of the fund's capital commitment in the portfolio company, the choice of method of divestment and the price at which the investment is completed. These factors are also key determinants of the efficiency of the private equity funds.